

# Announcements

HW9 due Friday (approximation)

Quiz 8 solutions posted on canvas

Upcoming plans:

Wed-Friday: using hardness for crypto (lectures by Noah Stephens-Davidowitz)

Next week: problems even harder than NP-complete

# Cryptography I


(See lecture notes for CS4830 at  
[https://www.noahsd.com/crypto\\_lecture\\_notes.html](https://www.noahsd.com/crypto_lecture_notes.html) .  
This is more-or-less Lecture 1 there.)

Noah Stephens-Davidowitz, April 15, 2026

# Cryptography

Sending a message privately

Being simple idea:  $c = m$



# **Cryptography**

**Sending a message privately**

# Cryptography

## Sending a message privately

Need a way to encrypt a plaintext  $m$  into a ciphertext  $c$ , which Bob can decrypt, but “does not reveal  $m$  to ~~Eve.~~”  
**Éva**

# Cryptography

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Ad hoc solutions:

①  $c = \text{"IGPAY ATINLAY"}$

$m = \text{"PIG LATIN"}$

②

$c = \text{"FWB J T T J M M Z"}$

$m = \text{"ÉVA IS SILLY"}$

$\begin{matrix} J & T & T & J & M & M & Z \\ \uparrow & \uparrow & \uparrow & \uparrow & \uparrow & \uparrow & \uparrow \\ I & S & S & I & L & L & Y \end{matrix}$

Caesars cipher  
 $A \rightarrow B \quad Y \rightarrow Z$   
 $B \rightarrow C \quad \dots \quad Z \rightarrow A$

# Encryption

**Sending a message privately**

# Encryption

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- An algorithm  $\text{Enc}$  s.t. if  $k \in K, m \in M$ , and  $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k, m)$ , then  $c \in C$ .

# Encryption

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- An algorithm  $\text{Dec}$  s.t. if  $k \in K, c \in C$ , and  $m = \text{Dec}(k, c)$ , then  $m \in M$ .
- **(Correctness.)**  $\forall m \in M, k \in K,$   
 $\text{Dec}(k, \text{Enc}(k, m)) = m.$

# Encryption

Perfect indistinguishability [Shannon, 1949]



Claude Shannon

# Encryption

Perfect indistinguishability [Shannon, 1949]

# Encryption

## Perfect indistinguishability [Shannon, 1949]

$m_0 = \text{"ÉVA IS SILLY"}$   
 $m_1 = \text{"ÉVA IS NOT AT ALL SILLY"}$

Def. An encryption scheme  $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  is perfectly indistinguishable if for any  $m_0, m_1 \in M$ , and  $c \in C$ ,

$$\Pr_{k \leftarrow \text{Gen}()} [\text{Enc}(k, m_0) = c] = \Pr_{k \leftarrow \text{Gen}()} [\text{Enc}(k, m_1) = c].$$

# Encryption

## Shannon's one-time pad [Shannon '1949]

$$K = M = C = \{0,1\}^n$$

$$\text{Gen()} \sim \{0,1\}^n$$

*sampled uniformly*

$$\text{Enc}(k, m) = k \oplus m$$

$$\text{Dec}(k, c) = k \oplus c$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 1100 \oplus 1001 = 0101 \\ \underline{1111} \quad \underline{1111} \quad \underline{1111} \end{array}$$

Correctness:

$$\text{Dec}(k, \text{Enc}(k, m)) = k \oplus (k \oplus m) = m$$

# Encryption

## Shannon's one-time pad [Shannon '1949]

$$K = M = C = \{0,1\}^n$$

$$\text{Gen}() \sim \{0,1\}^n$$

$$\text{Enc}(k, m) = k \oplus m$$


$$\text{Dec}(k, c) = k \oplus c$$

Thm. The one-time pad is perfectly indistinguishable.

Proof.

$$\Pr_{k \sim \{0,1\}^n} [k \oplus m_0 = c] = \Pr_{\substack{k \sim \{0,1\}^n \\ \text{uniform}}} [k = \underbrace{c \oplus m_0}_{\text{fixed string}}] = 2^{-n}$$

(I.e.,  $\forall m_0, m_1, c$ )


$$\Pr_{k \sim \{0,1\}^n} [ \text{Enc}(k, m_0) = c ] = \Pr_{k \sim \{0,1\}^n} [ \text{Enc}(k, m_1) = c ]$$


# Encryption

Only use the one-time pad once!

$$C_1 = k \oplus \text{"HELLO BOB"}$$

$$C_2 = k \oplus \text{"ÉVA IS SILLY"}$$



# Encryption

**Only use the one-time pad once!**

Thm. If  $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  is a perfectly indistinguishable (and correct) encryption scheme, then  $|K| \geq |M|$ .

**Encryption** **Éva**  
How powerful is ~~Eve~~?

# Encryption **Éva**

## How powerful is ~~Eve~~?

- Éva is really really smart [citation needed], but even she can't, for example, brute-force through  $2^{256}$  different secret keys!

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- Éva is really really smart [citation needed], but even she can't, for example, brute-force through  $2^{256}$  different secret keys!
- Whatever process Éva uses to try to read Alice's messages is itself an algorithm!

# Encryption ~~Éva~~

## How powerful is ~~Eve~~?

- Éva is really really smart [citation needed], but even she can't, for example, brute-force through  $2^{256}$  different secret keys!
- Whatever process Éva uses to try to read Alice's messages is itself an algorithm!
- Maybe we can find a way for Alice and Bob to communicate securely *without any shared secret key* in such a way that no **efficient** algorithm can figure out their message.

# **Cryptography**

**Fun example: Zero-knowledge proofs**